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The Authorial Delusion: Counting Lady Macbeth’s Children 
Abstract: 
In 1933, literary critic L.C. Knights published a caustic essay against the notion cultivated by 
certain of his colleagues, predominantly A.C. Bradley, that Shakespeare is a ‘great creator of 
characters’. Knights regarded the examination of isolated particles such as ‘character’ as 
disorientating, alleging that an analysis of this sort obscures the greater merit of language. 
Knight’s polemic essentially stands in the threshold of the dissention between formalists and 
realists: the former consider the examination of the fictional narrative as anything but a textual 
construct a scholarly faux pas; the latter regard the referential relationship between text and the 
world as a foundation for the creation of fiction. This is a pseudo-dilemma. The notion that 
literature is denuded of its artistic merit once it is defined by its constituent artifacts is 
disorienting, for it completely bypasses the dynamics of its creation. Put differently, a post-
event analysis can exist as a standalone act, albeit it cannot challenge or dismiss the 
foundational principles of the event’s creation process.  
 
Key-words: Fictional Character, Creative Processes, Theory of Mind, Imaginary Dialogues, 
Character Construction, Creative Writing Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
In her work, “Why do we care about literary characters” (2010), Blakey Vermeule 
suggests that a reader’s primary interest in the fictional character emerges as an inherent need 
for ‘gossip’, incriminating the popular, ‘unsophisticated’ genres in the market of endorsing 
reader sentimentality towards fictional characters. As she writes (2010), 
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In my view, most stories are gossip literature. The distinction, so carefully cultivated by 
literati and academics, between high and low, between popular and polite, pales beside 
the overwhelming similarity of gossip literature in all media (2010, 7). 
 
Vermeule’s (2010, ix-x) point is explicit in her preface, where she shares her disconcertment 
at her students’ disapproval of the character David Lurie in Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999). 
Vermeule also dismisses any analogy between character and the real human being, claiming 
that this is the one “single rule of her profession that needs to be honoured” (x). Finally, she 
considers the metaphor of the character speaking to her author-creator as a “cliché that is passed 
unquestioningly among writers” (2010, 47). 
 The scholar is right to question overly emotional responses towards a non-existing entity, as 
they deprive the reader from the opportunity of standing critically in front of a text. The dismissal, 
however, of any theoretical correlation between the fictional character and the human represents a 
lack of understanding of both the concept, as well as the dynamics of its creation. Texts are 
constructed by language yet inspired by concepts, perceptual products, and the personal 
experiences of their originators. Those experiences reflect upon, or are drawn by, real-life 
interactions, even if their conveyance is purely conceptual; the correspondence to the prototype is 
inevitable. What may be debatable is the degree of deviation from its paradigm. 
Furthermore, cognition and emotion do not stand on the two poles of an axis. Rather, 
they constitute the cognitive assemblage of a reader’s re-constructive act. As Suzanne Keen 
(2006, 213) notes, “[N]arrative empathy invoked by reading must involve cognition, for 
reading itself relies upon complex cognitive operations”. And she expands:  
In its strongest forms, aesthetics’ empathy describes a projective fusing with an object – 
which may be another person or an animal, but may also be a fictional character made of 
words, or even, in some accounts, inanimate things such as landscapes, artworks, or 
geological features. The acts of imagination and projection involved in such empathy 
certainly deserve the label cognitive, but the sensations, however strange, deserve to be 
registered as feelings. Thus I do not quarantine narrative empathy in the zone of either 
affect or cognition: as a process, it involves both. When texts invite readers to feel, they 
also stimulate readers’ thinking (2006. 213). 
 Finally, a school of thought that dismisses significant aspects of the creative process as 
‘unquestioningly circulated clichés’ cannot contribute to the bridging of the existing gap 
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between post-event analysis and the ex-novo creation. On the contrary, narrative construction 
and deconstruction in synergy can enhance the learning experience. 
 Overall, instead of negotiating the extraction of the character concept from its referential 
prototype, the focus should be shifted on a theory of agent construction based on the analysis 
of three foundational liaisons: the concept’s correlation to reality, to the reader, and to the 
author herself. 
 
2. The Author in the Obituaries 
In his work Image, music, text, Barthes (1977) declared the death of the author by 
contextually de-personifying the text, drawing the emphasis on the impersonality of language 
and rendering the (impersonal) reader the epicentre of the constructive process: 
The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture. ... The 
reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are inscribed 
without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its destination. 
Yet this destination cannot any longer be personal: the reader is without history, 
biography, psychology; he is simply that someone who holds together in a single field 
all the traces by which the written text is constituted (1977, 145 – 148). 
 The author is essentially dissociated from her creation, thus being rendered irrelevant to 
it. The text belongs to no one, it exists independent from defined subjects, and can only be 
decoded by a faceless decipherer – the reader. Again, the over-emphasis on language — the 
assemblage of semiotic symbols constructing meaningful concepts – is evident. Language is 
the author’s tool to communicate the products of her perception and creativity. However, it is 
not an end in itself. As Graham MacCann writes, 
Although critics often seek to justify the importance of language as a means of 
eliminating the aggressive authority of the human subject and its history of 
misdemeanours, they cannot escape this same history, and they end by erecting the 
edifice of language upon the tomb of the human self (1993, 77). 
 
 The signal cannot replace the signifier. Point in question, language itself has aided the 
author towards rendering her emphatic presence discreet, through tools such as the choice of 
4 
 
POV. At the same time, the novelist remains the originator of this conceptual assemblage, and, 
whilst the reader is now recognised as an active participant in the deconstruction of textual 
meaning, the former cannot be banned from its circumference altogether. A. Leon Pines writes 
accordingly: 
In language, relations and whole networks of relations are frozen into concepts labelled 
by words. These concepts and words capture the way a culture slices up reality: what 
relations are considered important enough to discriminate and preserve, what patterns 
and regularities have been worthwhile preserving, and so forth. ... Language serves the 
dual purpose of thought and communication. The ability to acquire and use language 
enables the amplification of meaningful experience (1985, 103-104). 
  
 The novelist creates, and does so by utilising and cultivating language. Symbols, hidden 
meanings or hypothetical intentions can only be evaluated as meta-linguistic devices without 
escaping their hermeneutic nature. As such, the text does not antagonise the concept; it defines 
and shapes it, as per the author’s aims, and the reader’s deconstruction, both of which can be 
examined within, or outside their status quo.  
  Returning to Vermeule’s original point, an overly emotional response towards David 
Lurie renders him a caricature; Lurie cannot be simply loved as ‘good’ or hated as ‘bad’. 
However, this is not because he is a “textual construct”; it is precisely the degree of 
correspondence to the real person that attributes the character in question his grandeur and 
depth, essentially discouraging exaggerated reactions. In fact, the constructs created to 
artificially serve the purposes of the aforementioned monotonous axis (good vs evil) are those 
prone to attracting extreme sentimentality. In such cases, the reader is no longer viewed as an 
active participant in the deconstruction of the text, but rather a recipient deprived from the 
prerogative of critical thinking and self-positioning, helpless to be saved from misdemeanors 
and unethical life-paths. As such, Suspension of Disbelief is compromised, for a premeditated 
intervention for purposes of moral didacticism will interrupt the natural flow of the narrative, 
abruptly extracting the reader from its textual dimensions. 
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 This is not to imply that literature bears no influence on society, or that novelists cannot 
be viewed as inspirational figures; rather, such impact should simply constitute an outcome of 
the reader-interpretation process. The author should strive for plausibility of character, to be 
established through a degree of approximation or deviation, by comparison to the prototype. 
The narrative’s reality will merge with the reader’s perception of her own reality, and any 
conclusions of moral substance will be drawn on a subjective level.  
 
3. The Author as Craftsman and Creator 
Many scholars are convinced that creating fictional worlds is an attributed gift and any 
attempt to apply technical principles on it is futile (Kundera, 1988; Gardner, 1983; O’Connor, 
1972; Scholes and Kellogg, 1966); others contend that writing is a skill to be learnt (King, 
2000; Seger, 1990; Egri, 1960).  The author is regarded as either the talented artist who creates 
guided by her instinct alone, or as the self-made craftsman who seeks, and with practice 
achieves, constant amelioration. 
   Research on creativity (Hahn, 1968) has demonstrated that its ‘trait’ is observable in 
every individual, in different degrees. More specifically, Hahn (1968, 5) has indicated that, 
“Masterpieces in any field are usually end products, often developed after much trial and error, 
during which time the understanding, skills and facts necessary to achieve the objective of the 
creative impulse are acquired”. J.P. Guildford (1959) initiated three major categories that the 
traits of creativity may fall under: fluency, which refers to the individual’s ability to retrieve 
stored information from her own memory; flexibility, pertaining to her problem-solving 
adjustability and approach; and elaboration, which constitutes the completion of the concept 
with details.  
 In a context of creative writing pedagogy, a theory of character creation can enhance 
academic knowledge and practice on an inter-disciplinary, epistemological level across the 
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Humanities and Social Sciences. If there is any indication that the reading of fiction can 
enhance social skills (Mar & Oatley, 2008), investigating the dynamics of character-creation 
through diversity and multidimensional depictions can promote social understanding further. 
The fictional text can be viewed as an imprint of the author’s consciousness on paper. Her 
aesthetic, emotive and perceptual abilities constitute the primary instruments at her disposal, 
guided within the realms of her cognitive maps and imaginative routes. Her own critical 
thinking and her ability to judge and define the outcome of her creative work should derive 
from both subjective impressions and the comprehension of the critical reasoning embedded 
within the disciplinary principles of theoretical analysis. Imagination is not just linked to 
creativity, but also to critical judgment (Johnson, 1987).  
 The accumulation of knowledge, both intellectual and emotive, as well as their 
interpretation, can be regarded as the foundational material of the author’s personal creative 
input into her work. As per Huhn’s definition (1968, 5), “Creativity is the ability and initiative 
to create new ideas and/or things by the restructuring or redefining of past experiences into 
new forms”. Similarly, Oatley (2003, 165) indicates that the synergetic process of perception 
and memory invocation equals the constructive projection of knowledge. As such, the creative 
process frequently referred to as ‘inspiration’ is in reality the result of a sequential and 
multidirectional course of the following stages: observation, perception, empathy and 
imagination. 
 Observation refers to an author’s inclination to notice her surrounding world. The 
impressions of all such accumulated images will constitute the solid platform on which she will 
build her narrative. As Gardner (1983, 24) indicates, the novelist’s task is to proffer “concrete 
images drawn from a careful observation”, observation of people’s behaviour imprinted in 
meticulous detail. Perception is reflected in her ability to be a participator at the same time, in 
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order to comprehend and translate stimuli into meaningful occurrences. Lee Martin illustrates 
this point accordingly: 
[F]iction writers are “spectators” of their characters, who are “participants” in the worlds 
of their stories—worlds that present situations containing their own demands for decision 
and action. If we imbue our fiction with aspects of ourselves—if we are ultimately both 
spectator and participant—it stands to reason that the key to learning something of 
ourselves and our worlds from the fiction we write lies in a successful merger of the two 
roles (1998, 173-174). 
 Empathy entails perceiving motives and desires that instigate choices and actions. It is 
precisely such capacity that allows authors to create believable anti-heroes and antagonists, 
even when reader allegiance is not possible due to cultural diversity and personal beliefs.  
 Finally, the interpreted scenes of daily life are not organised into sequential patterns, but 
rather are stored and rearranged in the writer’s mind, either to emerge accidentally or be 
intentionally evoked in order to be transformed into new ones. Locations, idiosyncrasies and 
physiognomies will become disarranged and intermixed into textual constructs, modified and 
restructured by the author’s perceptions. David Novitz (1987) considered fanciful imagination 
to be a prerequisite in the comprehension of one’s environment: 
[Fanciful imagination] plays an important role in adult attempts to decipher the more 
bewildering aspects of everyday life. For whenever established knowledge fails us, 
whenever there is no adequate conceptual apparatus with which to ease our confusion 
and bridge the gap between ignorance and insight, we fall back upon the fanciful 
imagination (1987, 32-33). 
 
 Novitz’s theory essentially refers to an author’s meta-perceptual activity, which entails 
translating united and dispersed images into logical sequences in order to decipher one’s 
spatiotemporal surroundings. Subsequently, perception and fantasy are not to be rigidly viewed 
as two distinct functions, but often the former encompasses the latter (Watkins, 1999, 146). 
Moreover, fantasy and imagination do not serve to distort reality, but rather enhance or reshape 
it into different structures. In that respect, imagination is a contributor to knowledge, rather 
than its conceptual alternator.   
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4. The Character Delusion: Dispelling the Myth 
 If the rendition of the real world through fiction is regarded as perceptively 
anthropocentric, analogously the epicentre of the narrative cosmos is the fictional character. It 
is this correlation between humans and fictional persons that places the author in such a unique 
position, for in principle she should be inherently predisposed to comprehend the essence of 
her subject. As Forster (1974, 54) noted, “Since the novelist is [her]self a human being, there 
is an affinity between [her] and [her] subject-matter which is absent in many other forms of 
art”.  
 The novelist invents and discovers her characters through her experience of the human 
person. Invents, because every textual being is conceived ex nihilo; discovers, because her 
individual textual elements, both ‘physical’ and idiosyncratic, will emerge from the author’s 
cognitive informational storage processed by her imagination. Put differently, the fictional 
agent is the creative conglomeration of all received data that constitutes the author’s 
inspirational provisions. An author’s ability to create a fictional character, from conception to 
textual exposition, is a process both inherent and consciously methodical at the same time.   
 Referring to the art of performing, Sonia Moore (1960) wrote: 
Stanislavski realized that an actor has to learn anew to see and not just to pretend to see, 
to hear and not just to pretend to listen ... that he has to think and to feel. ...  Stanislavski 
knew that an actor’s mind, will and emotions – the three forces responsible for our 
psychological life – must participate in the creation of a live human being on stage (1960, 
8-9). 
 
 Much like Stanislavski’s actor, the novelist is called to conceive the most delicate threads 
of a new identity, and bring it alive, not on stage, but through her text. These three ‘forces’ will 
also aid her to create a convincing textual on paper. As Marisha Pessl (2008) explains, 
[W]riting is a sort of acting exercise. You have to bring yourself and your own sensibility 
to your character, and yet you must diminish or augment certain aspects of yourself, see 
the world through their eyes, and judge the world according to their moral compass 
(2008, 38). 
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 The character becomes a separate entity, one the novelist is called to understand and 
follow. And yet such ‘independence’ is not always received well. 
 The contextual misinterpretation of the term ‘real’ more than often leads to 
unsubstantiated statements or even altogether rejections as ‘exaggerations’ or ‘clichés’ of the 
aforementioned creative process (Vermeule, 2000; Paris, 1999).  But as Taylor, Hodges and 
Kohanyi (2003) elaborate, 
In the positively-regarded context of creating writing, we are willing to accept the 
possibility of phenomenological peculiarities; we do not question the adult’s mental 
health. Writers certainly become immersed in the fantasy world they create and, as they 
work, may lose track of their real-world surroundings, but we doubt that novelists are 
seriously confused about the fantasy/reality distinction (2003, 365-366). 
 
 It is a hypothetical, imaginary experience that takes place in the author’s mind, one that 
will guide her to explore all possible paths of her character’s cognitive map. Describing the 
mental process that renders the fictional character ‘autonomous’, Taylor et al. (2003, 366) 
introduce the concept of ‘illusion of independent agency’: 
[T]he process of imagining the companion or the fictional world could become 
automatized until it is no longer consciously experienced. As the person readies him or 
herself for the imaginative act, the fantasy characters present themselves automatically. 
Their words and actions begin to be perceived, listened to, and recorded rather than 
consciously created. As a result, the imagined characters are experienced as speaking and 
acting independently (2003, 367). 
 
 The idea that all imaginary dialogues are symptomatic of psychopathology is refutable. 
A hypothetical interaction with a physically absent interlocutor should not automatically 
exclude the premeditation for such a process, depriving it from a conscious and specific 
purpose altogether. The fictional character is an inspired amalgamation of idiosyncratic 
attributes accumulated by a process of observation and comprehension of others, as well as 
thorough self-introspection. Subsequently, the symbolic soundless ‘voices’ of the characters 
speaking to the author emerge as variations of her cognition. Watkins (1999) explicates this as 
follows: 
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[W]e shall define “Self” as the collection of different characters ... who can be said to 
populate an individual’s thoughts, feelings, and actions. In other words, the Self is that 
world of characters whom one entertains and/or identifies with. ... Hence, when it is said 
that a dialogue is being carried out between self and imaginal other, the self here is the 
experiential locus of consciousness associated with the feeling of “I” (1999, 2). 
 
 Watkins (18-20) moves on to analyse Mead’s account of children’s fanciful play, 
according to which, such inner conversations contribute towards a realisation and 
determination of selfhood and society, through the adoption of alternative perspectives.  
Similarly, Keen (2006, 221) suggests that “[T]he activity of fiction-writing may cultivate 
novelists’ role-taking skills and make them more habitually empathetic”. Evidently, the 
theorists that dismiss the notion of ‘imaginal’ dialogues with characters as frivolous overlook 
this point precisely: that it is a premeditated, imaginary experience. Whether intentional or not, 
the de-centralisation of creativity and imagination as generators of such imaginal dialogues for 
the purpose of character germination, as well as the persistent contradistinction to a vague 
concept of reality, disorientates from the topic in question. The constant appeal to the delusion 
of influence bypasses the aforementioned point in its entirety. 
 Subsequently, the concept of character autonomy should not be examined outside the 
framework of a creative process. As Watkins (1999) indicates, 
In using the term “autonomy” I make no claim that such characters exist in objectified 
nature, in and of themselves, independently of their being experienced. Nor do I mean 
that their apprehended qualities are independent of their relationship with a particular ego 
(1999, 105). 
 
 Moreover, the diversity of those hypothetical voices permits the author to exist in a 
perpetual exploration of material, assuming the role of both an observer and a participator. It 
is not simply the accumulated, incorporated data that is being kneaded; a semi-experiential 
discovery of new ones is also taking place. To quote Watkins (1999, 95) once more, “These 
articulations are not only aimed at establishing a rudimentary sense of self but are an ongoing 
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and changing way of participating in the complex meanings and correlative definitions of se lf 
and world”. 
  Characters are a product of the author’s ingenuity and can only exist dependently and 
interrelated to it; the author can be viewed to surrender to what Taylor et al (2003) have 
described as ‘flow’: 
Flow refers to the pleasurable experience of becoming so totally absorbed in an activity 
that the sense of the passage of time is suspended, one loses track of the self and 
immediate surroundings, and the activity becomes effortless and unselfconscious. 
Authors often report the experience of flow while writing, as we suspect that flow might 
facilitate the development of autonomy in fictional characters (2003, 367). 
 
 The intentional interaction between the author and her characters is a process quite 
dissimilar to those experienced by persons with delusions or pathological conditions. To begin 
with, the latter are characterized by internal monologue (as opposed to imaginal dialogues), 
where the individual is sequentially usurped by a series of characters. This occurs outside of 
the self’s awareness, and it is defined exactly by its singleness, not multiplicity (Watkins 1999, 
107). Additionally, characterisation in such cases is superficial, enhancing only egocentric 
aspects that influence the ‘I’ (115); which comes into direct contrast with the creative writing 
act, where character-construction should be designated by multi-dimensionality and 
complexity. 
 
5. The Fictional Character: Towards a Definition 
In The Art of the Novel (1988), Kundera writes that, 
All novels, of every age, are concerned with the enigma of the self. As soon as you create 
an imaginary being, a character, you are automatically confronted by the question: What 
is the self? How can the self be grasped? It is one of those fundamental questions on 
which the novel, as novel, is based (1988, 23). 
 
The metaphysical implications of this question can be innumerable, and theories of 
personhood and the self inexhaustible. Different views have been held by various writers 
throughout the history of literature, and this is precisely where the creative attribution of each 
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comes into the equation. With that in mind, I define character as “the textual object that 
encompasses the functions of initiating and reciprocating action within the narrative, thus 
weaving the thread of the plot” (Varotsi, 2014). 
The nature of the correspondence between character and the real person is defined as 
much by the similarities between the two poles, as by their fundamental differences.  Kundera 
himself (1988, 33-34) resists the idea that the fictional character is a simulation of a human 
being, but rather speaks of “an experimental self with an existential problem”— referring thus 
to the type of narrative Harvey (1965, 134) described as “the subjective novel”. 
Again emerges the pseudo-dilemma of the character can either be reduced to a summary 
of textual symbols, or is regarded as the simulation of a human being. Yet this is not an ‘either 
or’ situation; a character is a textual construct, based on the experiential perception of a human 
being. She cannot have any true psychological dimensions, much like she cannot possess a real 
body, or exist in a real setting. She exists behind the textual cues, within the sphere of the author 
and reader’s cognition and imagination. As such, she is identifiable in her isolated singularity. 
As Harvey (1965) remarked: 
When, in real life, we try to describe a person’s character we generally speak in terms 
of a discrete identity. We think of it as something unique and separable from all other 
identities. We do this, of course, because the most intimate sense of character we can 
possibly have—our knowledge of self—is of this kind. ... From this we extrapolate a 
similar sense of the characters of others; they may be private and unknowable but they 
are like us at least in this respect (1965, 31). 
 
A character’s actions matter only if the reader is able to fathom them, and this 
interpretation is based on the inherent understanding of the human person regardless of the 
concept’s extent of deviation. Internal consistency ensures the external congruity of the 
narrative. Concsequently, the character can be viewed as a complex system of interrelated 
components in constant synergy and interaction (Varotsis, 2015). The character’s attributed 
idiosyncrasy will instigate events, or reacted to them, initiating new events, forming and 
reforming relationships with other characters, and so on.  The plausibility of the narrative will 
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highly depend on the agent consistency, and understanding of choices and motivations, even if 
reader allegiance due to socio-cultural norms and beliefs is not feasible. 
 
6. Conclusions 
My aim has been to challenge the notion advocated by certain post-event analysis 
scholars, that any correlation between the fictional agent and its prototype, the human being, is 
unsophisticated or unscholarly. The use of language should not overshadow creative processes, 
but actually constitute a tool in their implementation. Furthermore, any attempt to disassociate 
empathy from cognition overlooks that the former is precisely an inseparable function of the 
latter. Keen’s (2006) distinction between “empathy and sympathy” illustrates this point further. 
As she remarks (208), “In empathy, sometimes described as an emotion in its own right, we 
feel what we believe to be the emotions of others. ... Empathy is distinguished in both 
psychology and philosophy (though not in popular usage) from sympathy, in which feelings 
for another occur”. Isolating emotion from reader-response equals overlooking the experiential 
part of a text’s deconstruction.  
As creative writing pedagogy is constantly enriched, the necessity for an exclusive 
theoretical framework to support the practice of writing becomes all the more evident. Any 
correlations between the narrative, the concepts of reality and the world, as well as the fictional 
agent and the human person, should be put under scrutiny. An investigation of conceptual 
liaisons, as well as a foundational definition of character and its constituent components as per 
Smith’s (1995) person schema, is a solid step towards such a contribution. At the same time, 
ex novo creation and post-event analysis in synergy can enrich academia and industry, 
proffering further understanding to students and practitioners alike. 
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